Selected Publications
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Counterfactual thinking and false belief: The role of executive function
Stefane Drayton, Kandi J. Turley-Ames, & Nicole R. Guajardo
The purpose of the current study was to examine further the relationship between counterfactual thinking and false belief (FB) as examined by Guajardo and Turley-Ames (Cognitive Development, 19 (2004) 53–80). More specifically, the current research examined the importance of working memory and inhibitory control in understanding the relationship between counterfactual thinking and FB. Participants were 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds (N = 76). Counterfactual thinking statements generated accounted for significant variance in FB performance beyond age and language. Working memory and inhibitory control each partially mediated the relationship between counterfactual thinking and FB performance. The maturation of executive functioning skills is important in children’s developing understanding of counterfactual reasoning and FB. |
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Associations among false belief understanding, counterfactual reasoning, and executive function
Nicole R. Guajardo, Jessica Parker, & Kandi Turley-Ames
The primary purposes of the present study were to clarify previous work on the association between counterfactual thinking and false belief performance to determine (I) whether these two variables are related and (2) if so, whether executive function skills mediate the relationship. A total of 92 3-, 4-, and 5-yearolds completed false belief, counterfactual, working memory, representational flexibility, and language measures. Counterfactual reasoning accounted for limited unique variance in false belief. Both working memory and representational flexibility partially mediated the relationship between counterfactual and false belief. Children, like adults, also generated various types of counterfactual statements to differing degrees. Results demonstrated the importance of language and executive function for both counterfactual and false belief. Implications are discussed. |
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Effects of working memory capacity on mental set due to domain knowledge
Travis R. Ricks, Kandi Jo Turley-Ames, & Jennifer Wiley
The present set of studies examines how working memory capacity (WMC) relates to performance on a Remote Associates Task (RAT), originally designed by Mednick (1962) as a quantifiable creative problem solving assessment. The source of fixation was manipulated across two sets of RAT items. One set was neutral with no specific fixation embedded in them, while the second set was baseball-misleading, designed so that prior knowledge of baseball would lead to an incorrect solution attempt (Wiley, 1998). WMC scores were positively related to performance on RAT items in all conditions, except one. High baseball knowledge participants’ WMC scores did not relate to performance on the baseball-misleading RAT. While in general WMC may lead to better RAT performance, these results suggest that when there is a candidate solution strongly activated by prior knowledge, WMC may actually lead to too much focus on the incorrect solution and exacerbate mental sets. |
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A Game of Inches: Spontaneous Use of Counterfactuals by Broadcasters During Major League Baseball Playoffs
Lawrence J. Sanna, Craig D. Parks, Susanne Meier, Edward C. Chang, Brianna R. Kassin, Joshua L. Lechter, Kandi Jo Turley-Ames, & Tina M. Miyake
We tested whether counterfactuals are made spontaneously outside of the laboratory by coding sportscasters’ online verbalizations during 1998 and 1999 Major League Baseball (MLB) playoff broadcasts, and we assessed whether naturally occurring game features relating to closeness (score closeness, series closeness, game end, and playoff end) delineated some conditions under which counterfactuals were more likely. Sportscasters made counterfactuals quite frequently during these MLB playoff games. In addition, sportscasters uttered greater numbers of counterfactuals as games progressed from early to late innings, which was particularly true when scores were close. Counterfactuals were also uttered in greater numbers with closer scores when series were tied than when one team had a lead. Results are discussed in terms of spontaneous counterfactuals, closeness as an antecedent, and the ecological validity of such thoughts. |
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Counterfactual intensity
Lawrence J. Sanna & Kandi Jo Turley-Ames
Counterfactual intensity, the strength with which counterfactuals are experienced, influenced the magnitude of affective and preparative reactions. Intensity influenced reactions when counterfactual numbers were held constant for samples of participants' actual experiences (Study 1) and contributed significantly to responses over counterfactual numbers (Study 2) and reaction times (Study 3) after performing laboratory tasks. This was found when participants spontaneously generated counterfactuals (Study 2), and when participants responded to counterfactual statements (Study 3). As upward counterfactuals became intense, so did greater preparation and worse moods; as downward counterfactuals became intense, so did better moods and lesser preparation.Intense moods also conversely influenced the intensity of counterfactuals (Study 3). Conceptual and methodological implications and possibilities for future research are discussed. |
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Mood, self-esteem, and simulated alternatives: thought-provoking affective influences on counterfactual direction
Lawrence J. Sanna, Kandi Jo Turley-Ames, & Susanne Meier
Four studies indicated that moods and self-esteem can influence counterfactual thoughts. This was shown for counterfactuals generated for hypothetical situations (Study 1), for recalled life events (Study 2), and for agreement with counterfactual statements after laboratory tasks (Studies 3 and 4). High self-esteem (HSE) and low self-esteem (LSE) persons generated (Studies 1 and 2) or agreed to (Studies 3 and 4) more downward (worse than actuality) than upward (better than actuality) counterfactuals when in good moods, but they diverged in reactions to bad moods: HSE persons thought more about downward counterfactuals, whereas LSE persons thought more about upward counterfactuals. HSE persons felt better after generating downward counterfactuals (Study 2) and took longer to agree to analogous statements (Studies 3 and 4) in bad moods, suggesting attempts at mood repair. |
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Strategy Training and working memory task performance
Kandi Jo Turley-Ames & Michelle M. Whitfield
Three experiments examined how strategy use influences working memory (WM) span performance and the correlation between WM span scores and higher cognitive function, using the operation span measure and the Nelson–Denny assessment of reading ability. Participants completed two versions of the operation span measure in a pre/post-test design. In each study, half of the participants received strategy instructions prior to post-test. In Study 1, WM span scores increased as result of using a rehearsal strategy. In Study 2, three different strategies (rehearsal, imagery, and semantic) were compared. Low spans, in particular, benefited from using a rehearsal strategy. Also, the relationship between WM span scores and Nelson–Denny reading ability composite scores was enhanced, suggesting that strategy use, unless controlled for, can mask the “true” relationship between WM span and reading ability scores. In Study 3, time spent using the strategies described in Study 2 was controlled. Although no particular span group benefited from using any one strategy, WM span scores obtained while participants used the rehearsal strategy was, again, more predictive of reading ability. The importance of controlling for variation in strategy use during assessments of WM span is discussed. |
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